

The World the War Created, 1945-1952

Clark Clifford, Memorandum to President Truman (1946)

White House Special Counsel Clark Clifford prepared this private memorandum for President Truman in 1946. Clifford was particularly influenced by George Kennan's diplomatic cables from Moscow, which emphasized the need for U.S. "containment" of Soviet aggression. The memo also reflects the view of the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy, as well as the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Clifford deftly summarized the "hard line" view toward the Soviet Union, then emerging as the consensus position among administration officials. SOURCE: Clark Clifford to President Truman, September 24, 1946. Clark Clifford Papers, Harry S. Truman Library, in William Chafe and Harvard Sitkoff, eds., A History of Our Time (Oxford, 1991).

A direct threat to American security is implicit in Soviet foreign policy which is designed to prepare the Soviet Union for war with the leading capitalistic nations of the world. Soviet leaders recognize that the United States will be the Soviet Union's most powerful enemy if such a war as that predicted by Communist theory ever comes about and therefore the United States is the chief target of Soviet foreign and military policy....

The most obvious Soviet threat to American security is the growing ability of the USSR to wage an offensive war against the United States. This has not hitherto been possible, in the absence of Soviet long-range strategic air power and an almost total lack of sea power. Now, however, the USSR is rapidly developing elements of her military strength which she hitherto lacked and which will give the Soviet Union great offensive capabilities. Stalin has declared his intention of sparing no effort to build up the military strength of the Soviet Union. Development of atomic weapons, guided missiles, materials for biological warfare, a strategic air force, submarines of great cruising range, naval mines and mine craft, to name the most important, are extending the effective range of Soviet military power well into areas which the United States regards as vital to its security.... The primary objective of United States policy toward the Soviet Union is to convince Soviet leaders that it is in their interest to participate in a system of world cooperation, that there are no fundamental causes for war between our two nations, and that the security and prosperity of the Soviet Union, and that of the rest of the world as well, is being jeopardized by the aggressive militaristic imperialism such as that in which the Soviet Union is now engaged.

However, these same leaders with whom we hope to achieve an understanding on the principles of international peace appear to believe that a war with the United States and the other leading capitalistic nations is inevitable. They are increasing their military power and the sphere of Soviet influence in preparation for the "inevitable" conflict, and they are trying to weaken and subvert their potential opponents by every means at their disposal. So long as these men adhere to these beliefs, it is highly dangerous to conclude that hope of international peace lies only in "accord," "mutual understanding," or "solidarity" with the Soviet Union.

Adoption of such a policy would impel the United States to make sacrifices for the sake of Soviet-U.S. relations, which would only have the effect of raising Soviet hopes and increasing Soviet demands, and to ignore alternative lines of policy, which might be much more compatible with our own national and international interests.

The Soviet government will never be easy to "get along with." The American people must accustom themselves to this thought, not as a cause for despair, but as a fact to be faced objectively and courageously. If we find it impossible to enlist Soviet cooperation in the solution of world problems, we should be prepared to join with the British and other Western countries in an attempt to build up a world of our own which will pursue its own objectives and will recognize the Soviet orbit as a distinct entity with which conflict is not predestined but with

which we cannot pursue common aims.

As long as the Soviet government maintains its present foreign policy, based upon the theory of an ultimate struggle between communism and capitalism, the United States must assume that the USSR might fight at any time for the two-fold purpose of expanding the territory under Communist control and weakening its potential capitalist opponents. The Soviet Union was able to flow into the political vacuum of the Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Near East, Manchuria and Korea because no other nation was both willing and able to prevent it. Soviet leaders were encouraged by easy success and they are now preparing to take over new areas in the same way. The Soviet Union, as Stalin euphemistically phrased it, is preparing "for any eventuality."

Unless the United States is willing to sacrifice its future security for the sake of "accord" with the USSR now, this government must, as a first step toward world stabilization, seek to prevent additional Soviet aggression.... This government should be prepared, while scrupulously avoiding any act which would be an excuse for the Soviets to begin a war, to resist vigorously and successfully any efforts of the USSR to expand into areas vital to American security.

The language of military power is the only language which disciples of power politics understand. The United States must use that language in order that Soviet leaders will realize that our government is determined to uphold the interests of its citizens and the rights of small nations. Compromise and concessions are considered, by the Soviets, to be evidences of weakness and they are encouraged by our "retreats" to make new and greater demands.

The main deterrent to Soviet attack on the United States, or to attack on areas of the world which are vital to our security, will be the military power of this country. It must be made apparent to the Soviet government that our strength will be sufficient to repel any attack and sufficient to defeat the USSR decisively if a war should start. The prospect of defeat is the only sure means of deterring the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union's vulnerability is limited due to the vast area over which its key industries and natural resources are widely dispersed, but it is vulnerable to atomic weapons, biological warfare, and long-range power. Therefore, in order to maintain our strength at a level which will be effective in restraining the Soviet Union, the United States must be prepared to wage atomic and biological warfare. A highly mechanized army, which can be moved either by sea or by air, capable of seizing and holding strategic areas, must be supported by powerful naval and air forces. A war with the USSR would be "total" in a more horrible sense than any previous war and there must be constant research for both offensive and defensive weapons.

Whether it would actually be in this country's interest to employ atomic and biological weapons against the Soviet Union in the event of hostilities is a question which would require careful consideration in the light of the circumstances prevailing at the time. The decision would probably be influenced by a number of factors, such as the Soviet Union's capacity to employ similar weapons, which can not now be estimated. But the important point is that the United States must be prepared to wage atomic and biological warfare if necessary. The mere fact of preparedness may be the only powerful deterrent to Soviet aggressive action and in this sense the only sure guaranty of peace.

The United States, with a military potential composed primarily of [highly] effective technical weapons, should entertain no proposal for disarmament or limitation of armament as long as the possibility of Soviet aggression exists. Any discussion on the limitation of armaments should be pursued slowly and carefully with the knowledge constantly in mind that proposals on outlawing atomic warfare and long-range offensive weapons would greatly limit United States strength, while only moderately affecting the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union relies primarily on a large infantry and artillery force and the result of such arms limitation would be to deprive the United States of its most effective weapons without impairing the Soviet Union's ability to wage a quick war

of aggression in Western Europe, the Middle East or the Far East....

In addition to maintaining our own strength, the United States should support and assist all democratic countries which are in any way menaced or endangered by the USSR. Providing military support in case of attack is a last resort; a more effective barrier to communism is strong economic support. Trade agreements, loans and technical missions strengthen our ties with friendly nations and are effective demonstrations that capitalism is at least the equal of communism. The United States can do much to ensure that economic opportunities, personal freedom and social equality are made possible in countries outside the Soviet sphere by generous financial assistance. Our policy on reparations should be directed toward strengthening the areas we are endeavoring to keep outside the Soviet sphere. Our efforts to break down trade barriers, open up rivers and international waterways, and bring about economic unification of countries, now divided by occupation armies, are also directed toward the re-establishment of vigorous and healthy non-Communist economies.

In conclusion, as long as the Soviet government adheres to its present policy, the United States should maintain military forces powerful enough to restrain the Soviet Union and to confine Soviet influence to its present area. All nations not now within the Soviet sphere should be given generous economic assistance and political support in their opposition to Soviet penetration. Economic aid may also be given to the Soviet government and private trade with the USSR permitted provided the results are beneficial to our interests....

Even though Soviet leaders profess to believe that the conflict between Capitalism and Communism is irreconcilable and must eventually be resolved by the triumph of the latter, it is our hope that they will change their minds and work out with us a fair and equitable settlement when they realize that we are too strong to be beaten and too determined to be frightened.

General Douglas MacArthur, Excerpt, Farewell Address to Congress (April 19, 1951)

General MacArthur, who had headed the military campaign in Korean War, had already been dismissed by President Truman but continued to hold strong ideas about the conflict. He captured the public's attention when he gave this address to a joint session of Congress, pouring new life into a memorable passage about the fate of retired military personnel.

There are some who, for varying reasons, would appease Red China. They are blind to history's clear lesson, for history teaches with unmistakable emphasis that appeasement but begets new and bloodier war. It points to no single instance where this end has justified that means, where appeasement has led to more than a sham peace. Like blackmail, it lays the basis for new and successively greater demands until, as in blackmail, violence becomes the only other alternative.

"Why," my soldiers asked of me, "surrender military advantages to an enemy in the field?" I could not answer.

Some may say: to avoid spread of the conflict into an all-out war with China; others, to avoid Soviet intervention. Neither explanation seems valid, for China is already engaging with the maximum power it can commit, and the Soviet will not necessarily mesh its actions with our moves. Like a cobra, any new enemy will more likely strike whenever it feels that the relativity in military or other potential is in its favor on a world-wide basis.

The tragedy of Korea is further heightened by the fact that its military action is confined to its territorial limits. It condemns that nation, which it is our purpose to save, to suffer the devastating impact of full naval and air bombardment while the enemy's sanctuaries are fully protected from such attack and

devastation.

Of the nations of the world, Korea alone, up to now, is the sole one which has risked its all against communism. The magnificence of the courage and fortitude of the Korean people defies description. They have chosen to risk death rather than slavery. Their last words to me were: "Don't scuttle the Pacific!"

I have just left your fighting sons in Korea. They have met all tests there, and I can report to you without reservation that they are splendid in every way.

It was my constant effort to preserve them and end this savage conflict honorably and with the least loss of time and a minimum sacrifice of life. Its growing bloodshed has caused me the deepest anguish and anxiety.

Those gallant men will remain often in my thoughts and in my prayers always.

I am closing my 52 years of military service. When I joined the Army, even before the turn of the century, it was the fulfillment of all of my boyish hopes and dreams. The world has turned over many times since I took the oath on the plain at West Point, and the hopes and dreams have long since vanished, but I still remember the refrain of one of the most popular barrack ballads of that day which proclaimed most proudly that "old soldiers never die; they just fade away."

And like the old soldier of that ballad, I now close my military career and just fade away, an old soldier who tried to do his duty as God gave him the light to see that duty.

Good Bye.

George F. Kennan, The Long Telegram (1946)

In February 1946, George F. Kennan, U.S. charge d'affaires in Moscow, sent an 8,000-word telegram to the U.S. State Department warning Washington of Soviet foreign policy and the threat it represented to U.S. security. Kennan claimed that the Soviet government would do anything in its power to undermine the capitalist system of Western democracies in an effort to strengthen the power of the U.S.S.R. He argued that the only way to deal with the Soviet government and its communist policies was through a policy that came to be known as "containment."

We have here a political force committed fanatically to the belief that with US there can be no permanent *modus vivendi*, that it is desirable and necessary that the internal harmony of our society be disrupted, our traditional way of life be destroyed, the international authority of our state be broken, if Soviet power is to be secure. This political force has complete power of disposition over energies of one of world's greatest peoples and resources of world's richest national territory, and is borne along by deep and powerful currents of Russian nationalism. In addition, it has an elaborate and far flung apparatus for exertion of its influence in other countries, an apparatus of amazing flexibility and versatility, managed by people whose experience and skill in underground methods are presumably without parallel in history. . . . This is admittedly not a pleasant picture. Problem of how to cope with this force in *[is]* undoubtedly greatest task our diplomacy has ever faced and probably greatest it will ever have to face. It should be point of departure from which our political general staff work at present juncture should proceed. It should be approached with same thoroughness and care as solution of major strategic problem in war, and if necessary, with no smaller outlay in planning effort. I cannot attempt to suggest all answers here. But I would like to record my conviction that problem is within our power to solve--and that without recourse to any general military conflict. And in support of this conviction there are certain observations of a more encouraging nature I should like to make:

(1) Soviet power, unlike that of Hitlerite Germany, is neither schematic nor adventuristic. It does not work by fixed plans. It does not take unnecessary risks. Impervious to logic of reason, and it is highly sensitive to logic of force. For this reason it can easily withdraw--and usually does--when strong resistance is encountered at any point. Thus, if the adversary has sufficient force and makes clear his readiness to use it, he rarely has to do so. If situations are properly handled there need be no prestige-engaging showdowns.

(2) Gauged against Western World as a whole, Soviets are still by far the weaker force. Thus, their success will really depend on degree of cohesion, firmness and vigor which Western World can muster. And this is factor which it is within our power to influence.

(3) Success of Soviet system, as form of internal power, is not yet finally proven. It has yet to be demonstrated that it can survive supreme test of successive transfer of power from one individual or group to another. Lenin's death was

first such transfer, and its effects wracked Soviet state for 15 years. After Stalin's death or retirement will be second. But even this will not be final test. Soviet internal system will now be subjected, by virtue of recent territorial expansions, to series of additional strains which once proved severe tax on Tsardom. We here are convinced that never since termination of civil war have mass of Russian people been emotionally farther removed from doctrines of Communist Party than they are today. In Russia, party has now become a great and--for the moment--highly successful apparatus of dictatorial administration, but it has ceased to be a source of emotional inspiration. Thus, internal soundness and permanence of movement need not yet be regarded as assured.

(4) All Soviet propaganda beyond Soviet security sphere is basically negative and destructive. It should therefore be relatively easy to combat it by any intelligent and really constructive program.

For these reasons I think we may approach calmly and with good heart problem of how to deal with Russia. As to how this approach should be made, I only wish to advance, by way of conclusion, following comments:

(1) Our first step must be to apprehend, and recognize for what it is, the nature of the movement with which we are dealing. We must study it with same courage, detachment, objectivity, and same determination not to be emotionally provoked or unseated by it, with which doctor studies unruly and unreasonable individual.

(2) We must see that our public is educated to realities of Russian situation. I cannot over-emphasize importance of this. Press cannot do this alone. It must be done mainly by Government, which is necessarily more experienced and better informed on practical problems involved. In this we need not be deterred by [ugliness?] of picture. I am convinced that there would be far less hysterical anti-Sovietism in our country today if realities of this situation were better understood by our people. There is nothing as dangerous or as terrifying as the unknown. It may also be argued that to reveal more information on our difficulties with Russia would reflect unfavorably on Russian-American relations. I feel that if there is any real risk here involved, it is one which we should have courage to face, and sooner the better. But I cannot see what we would be risking. Our stake in this country, even coming on heels of tremendous demonstrations of our friendship for Russian people, is remarkably small. We have here no investments to guard, no actual trade to lose, virtually no citizens to protect, few cultural contacts to preserve. Our only stake lies in what we hope rather than what we have; and I am convinced we have better chance of realizing those hopes if our public is enlightened and if our dealings with Russians are placed entirely on realistic and matter-of-fact basis.

(3) Much depends on health and vigor of our own society. World communism is like malignant parasite which feeds only on diseased tissue. This is point at which domestic and foreign policies meet. Every courageous and incisive measure to solve internal problems of our own society, to improve self-confidence, discipline, morale and community spirit of our own people, is a diplomatic victory over Moscow worth a thousand diplomatic notes and joint communiqués. If we cannot abandon fatalism and indifference in face of deficiencies of our own society, Moscow will profit-Moscow cannot help profiting by them in its foreign policies.

(4) We must formulate and put forward for other nations a much more positive and constructive picture of sort of world we would like to see than we have put forward in past. It is not enough to urge people to develop political processes similar to our own. Many foreign peoples, in Europe at least, are tired and frightened by experiences of past, and are less interested in abstract freedom than in security. They are seeking guidance rather than responsibilities. We should be better able than Russians to give them this. And unless we do, Russians certainly will.

(5) Finally we must have courage and self-confidence to cling to our own methods and conceptions of human society. After all, the greatest danger that can befall us in coping with this problem of Soviet communism, is that we shall allow ourselves to become like those with whom we are coping.

Henry Wallace, Letter to President Truman (1946)

Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace found himself a lone voice of dissent within the Truman Administration. An ardent New Dealer, Wallace had served as Secretary of Agriculture and Vice President under President Roosevelt. If he had not been removed from the Democratic ticket in 1944 to placate southern conservatives, Wallace rather than Truman would have succeeded FDR. Wallace was deeply disturbed by what he thought was a reversal of the wartime policy of cooperation with the U.S.S.R. He expressed his views privately here, but when he publicly broke with the President two months later, Truman fired him. SOURCE: Henry Wallace to

I have been increasingly disturbed about the trend of international affairs since the end of the war, and I am even more troubled by the apparently growing feeling among the American people that another war is coming and the only way that we can head it off is to arm ourselves to the teeth. Yet all of past history indicates that an armaments race does not lead to peace but to war. The months just ahead may well be the crucial period which will decide whether the civilized world will go down in destruction after the five or ten years needed for several nations to arm themselves with atomic bombs. Therefore I want to give you my views on how the present trend toward conflict might be averted....

How do American actions since V-J Day appear to other nations? I mean by actions the concrete things like \$13 billion for the War and Navy Departments, the Bikini tests of the atomic bomb and continued production of bombs, the plan to arm Latin America with our weapons, production of B-29s and planned production of B-36s, and the effort to secure air bases spread over half the globe from which the other half of the globe can be bombed. I cannot but feel that these actions must make it look to the rest of the world as if we were only paying lip service to peace at the conference table.

These facts rather make it appear either (1) that we are preparing ourselves to win the war which we regard as inevitable or (2) that we are trying to build up a predominance of force to intimidate the rest of mankind. How would it look to us if Russia had the atomic bomb and we did not, if Russia had 10,000-mile bombers and air bases within a thousand miles of our coastlines, and we did not?

Some of the military men and self-styled "realists" are saying: "What's wrong with trying to build up a predominance of force? The only way to preserve peace is for this country to be so well armed that no one will dare attack us. We know that America will never start a war."

The flaw in this policy is simply that it will not work. In a world of atomic bombs and other revolutionary new weapons, such as radioactive poison gases and biological warfare, a peace maintained by a predominance of force is no longer possible.

Why is this so? The reasons are clear:

First. Atomic warfare is cheap and easy compared with old-fashioned war. Within a very few years several countries can have atomic bombs and other atomic weapons. Compared with the cost of large armies and the manufacture of old-fashioned weapons, atomic bombs cost very little and require only a relatively small part of a nation's production plant and labor force.

Second. So far as winning a war is concerned, having more bombs - even many more bombs - than the other fellow is no longer a decisive advantage. If another nation had enough bombs to eliminate all of our principal cities and our heavy industry, it wouldn't help us very much if we had ten times as many bombs as we needed to do the same to them.

Third. And most important, the very fact that several nations have atomic bombs will inevitably result in neurotic, fear-ridden, itching-trigger psychology in all the peoples of the world, and because of our wealth and vulnerability we would be among the most seriously affected. Atomic war will not require vast and time-consuming preparations, the mobilization of large armies, the conversion of a large proportion of a country's industrial plants to the manufacture of weapons. In a world armed with atomic weapons, some incident will lead to the use of those weapons.

There is a school of military thinking which recognizes these facts, recognizes that when several nations have atomic bombs, a war which will destroy modern civilization will result and that no nation or combination of nations can win such a war. This school of thought therefore advocates a "preventive war," an attack on Russia now before Russia has atomic bombs.

This scheme is not only immoral, but stupid. If we should attempt to destroy all the principal Russian cities and her heavy industry, we might well succeed. But the immediate countermeasure which such an attack would call forth is the prompt occupation of all Continental Europe by the Red Army. Would we be prepared to destroy the cities of all Europe in trying to finish what we had started? This idea is so contrary to all the basic instincts and principles of the American people that any such action would be possible only under a dictatorship at home....

Our basic distrust of the Russians, which has been greatly intensified in recent months by the playing up of conflict in the press, stems from differences in political and economic organization. For the first time in our history defeatists among us have raised the fear of another system as a successful rival to democracy and free enterprise in other countries and perhaps even our own. I am convinced that we can meet that challenge as we have in the past by demonstrating that economic abundance can be achieved without sacrificing personal, political and religious liberties. We cannot meet it as Hitler tried to by an anti-Comintern alliance.

It is perhaps too easy to forget that despite the deep-seated differences in our cultures and intensive anti-Russian propaganda of some twenty-five years' standing, the American people reversed their attitudes during the crisis of war. Today, under the pressure of seemingly insoluble international problems and continuing deadlocks, the tide of American public opinion is again turning against Russia. In this reaction lies one of the dangers to which this letter is addressed.

I should list the factors which make for Russian distrust of the United States and of the Western world as follows. The first is Russian history, which we must take into account because it is the setting in which Russians see all actions and policies of the rest of the world. Russian history for over a thousand years has been a succession of attempts, often unsuccessful, to resist invasion and conquest - by the Mongols, the Turks, the Swedes, the Germans and the Poles. The scant thirty years of the existence of the Soviet Government has in Russian eyes been a continuation of their historical struggle for national existence. The first four years of the new regime, from 1917 through 1921, were spent in resisting attempts at destruction by the Japanese, British and French, with some American assistance, and by the several White Russian armies encouraged and financed by the Western powers. Then, in 1941, the Soviet State was almost conquered by the Germans after a period during which the Western European powers had apparently acquiesced in the rearming of Germany in the belief that the Nazis would seek to expand eastward rather than westward. The Russians, therefore, obviously see themselves as fighting for their existence in a hostile world.

Second, it follows that to the Russians all of the defense and security measures of the Western powers seem to have an aggressive intent. Our actions to expand our military security system - such steps as extending the Monroe Doctrine to include the arming of the Western Hemisphere nations, our present monopoly of the atomic bomb, our interest in outlying bases and our general support of the British Empire - appear to them as going far beyond the requirements of defense. I think we might feel the same if the United States were the only capitalistic country in the world, and the principal socialistic countries were creating a level of armed strength far exceeding anything in their previous history. From the Russian point of view, also, the granting of a loan to Britain and the lack of tangible results on their request to borrow for rehabilitation purposes may be regarded as another evidence of strengthening an anti-Soviet bloc.

Finally, our resistance to her attempts to obtain warm-water ports and her own security system in the form of "friendly" neighboring states seems, from the Russian point of view, to clinch the case. After twenty-five years of isolation and after having achieved the status of a major power, Russia believes that she is entitled to recognition of her new status. Our interest in establishing democracy in Eastern Europe, where democracy by

and large has never existed, seems to her is an attempt to re-establish the encirclement of unfriendly neighbors which was created after the last war, and which might serve as a springboard of still another effort to destroy her....

We should make an effort to counteract the irrational fear of Russia which is being systematically built up in the American people by certain individuals and publications. The slogan that communism and capitalism, regimentation and democracy, cannot continue to exist in the same world is, from a historical point of view, is pure propaganda. Several religious doctrines, all claiming to be the only true gospel and salvation, have existed side by side with a reasonable degree of tolerance for centuries. This country was for the first half of its national life a democratic island in a world dominated in by absolutist governments.

We should not act as if we too felt that we were threatened in today's world. We are by far the most powerful nation in the world, the only Allied nation which came out of the war without devastation and much stronger than before the war. Any talk on our part about the need for strengthening our defenses further is bound to appear hypocritical to other nations....

The real test lies in the achievement of international unity. It will be fruitless to continue to seek solutions for the many specific problems that face us in the making of the peace and in the establishment of an enduring international order without first achieving an atmosphere of mutual trust and confidence. The task admittedly is not an easy one....

Fundamentally, this comes down to the point discussed earlier in this letter, that even our own security, in the sense that we have known it in the past, cannot be preserved by military means in a world armed with atomic weapons. The only type of security which can be maintained by our own military force is the type described by a military man before the Senate Atomic Energy Commission - a security against invasion after all our cities and perhaps 40 million of our city population have been destroyed by atomic weapons. That is the best that "security" on the basis of armaments has to offer us. It is not the kind of security that our people and the people of the other United Nations are striving for.

Joseph R. McCarthy, Wheeling, West Virginia Speech (1950)

The speech excerpted below marked Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy's first public accusation that communists were infiltrating the U.S. government. He would, of course, make many subsequent charges in his rabid search for communists. At this early point in his communist hunt, he was especially critical of the State Department and Secretary of State Dean Acheson (the "pompous diplomat in striped pants"), particularly Acheson's public support of accused traitor Alger Hiss.

Five years after a world war has been won, men's hearts should anticipate a long peace, and men's minds should be free from the heavy weight that comes from war. But this is not such a period-for this is not a period of peace. This is a time of the "cold war." This is a time when all the world is split into two vast, increasingly hostile armed camps. . . .

The reason why we find ourselves in a position of impotency is not because our only powerful potential enemy has sent men to invade our shores, but rather because of the traitorous actions of those who have been treated so well by this Nation. It has not been the less fortunate or members of minority groups who have been selling this Nation out, but rather those who have had all the benefits that the wealthiest nation on earth has to offer-the finest homes, the finest college education, and the finest jobs in Government.

This is glaringly true in the State Department. There the bright young men who are born with silver spoons in their mouths are the ones who have been the worst.

. . . In my opinion, the State Department, which is one of the most important government departments, is thoroughly infested with Communists.

I have in my hand 57 cases of individuals who would appear to be either card carrying members or certainly loyal to the Communist Party, but who nevertheless are still helping to shape our foreign policy. . . .

As you know, very recently the Secretary of State proclaimed his loyalty to a man guilty of what has always been considered as the most abominable of all crimes-of being a traitor to the people who gave him a position of great trust. The Secretary of State in attempting to justify his continued devotion to the man who sold out the Christian world to the atheistic world, referred to Christ's Sermon on the Mount as a justification and reason therefore, and the reaction of the American people to this would have made the heart of Abraham Lincoln happy.

When this pompous diplomat in striped pants, with a phony British accent, proclaimed to the American people that Christ on the Mount endorsed communism, high treason, and a betrayal of a sacred trust, the blasphemy was so great that it awakened the dormant indignation of the American people.

He has lighted the spark which is resulting in a moral uprising and will end only when the whole sorry mess of twisted, warped thinkers are swept from the national scene so that we may have a new birth of national honesty and decency in government.

Kenneth MacFarland, "The Unfinished Work" (1946)

The surrender of first German and then Japan in 1945 ended the incredible destruction of World War II. The atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki introduced a new and deadly force into the world. Moreover, as described in this document from 1946, many Americans began to see the Soviet Union as the new enemy and the major threat to peace. This document accurately describes the fears that would become prevalent in the United States during the Cold War.

One who traveled about over the country a year ago this month, talking with taxi drivers, bell hops, policemen, business employees, and others who reflect the thinking of the man-on-the-street, found the conversation all to be along the same lines. The war was over, the boys would be coming home now, rationing would end. Truman was doing better than expected, we must resolutely work together to build one world in which war would be outlawed and the principles of the Atlantic Charter would hold sway. The keynote a year ago was one of joyous relief that the bloodiest conflict in all history had ended in complete victory over the enemy, and a feeling of faith that we had at last learned our lesson sufficiently well to outlaw war. There was confidence that an effective United Nations organization would be developed.

But today, one year after, that buoyant faith has turned to cynicism. Hope in the United Nations is largely gone. The average American has already resigned himself to a future in which there will be at least two worlds instead of one. Having given up his hope for a better world, the average man has ceased to realize how terribly important it is that we keep striving, and he has settled down to bickering over a myriad of minor issues here on the domestic scene. . . .

There is a strange fear and insecurity in America today. The people fear that in winning the war we introduced a new power into the world which may in turn engulf us. As James Reston says in a recent article,

"Among the reflective people of the country, among the leaders of the communities and those who aspire to political office, fear for the security of America and doubt about the ability of America to solve its own problems seem stronger today than ever in memory.

"It is an astonishing fact, but after an unprecedented war in which the enemies on the field of battle were entirely defeated, the people seem to feel less secure than they did before they were attacked, or even when the tide of war was running strongest against them."

In this year that has passed since the ending of the war we have found we cannot immediately shut off the hates that were generated during the struggle. Racial tensions have burst into open flame. Minority groups are being terrorized

by hoodlums who seek only personal gain from such persecution. There is unprecedented confusion in our political life. Special interest groups raise slush funds to purge congressmen who failed to support their particular legislative programs. Many politicians totally forget the sacred obligation of public office holding and appeal to the basest motives to win re-election. Yes, America has retrogressed to a dangerous degree in the 387 days since General MacArthur proclaimed to the world that Japan had surrendered unconditionally. We have lost the faith that won the fight just when we needed it most to win the peace. *We have demobilized our patriotism far too soon.* . . .

Today there is a powerfully organized force that is working unceasingly to prolong the confusion. This is the first post-war period in which we have had to contend with a highly organized effort to prevent recovery. *We are fools unless we awaken to the fact that a great campaign is being carried on in America today to perpetuate chaos, and that campaign is being directed from abroad by a force that wants democracy to fail.* This highly organized and well financed power reaches into key positions in numerous organizations and publications, institutions of learning, and into the government itself. There is the new, the unprecedented, and by far the most dangerous element in the clashing cross currents which torment our times.

The identical force which is spreading the gospel of despair and dissension in America today is almost solely responsible for the black cloud that obscures the sunshine of peace on the international horizon. Out in Salt Lake City on the twelfth day of last month, America's only living Ex-President, Herbert Clark Hoover, said,

"The dominant note in the world today is not one of hope and confidence, but rather one of fear and frustration. . . . Far from freedom having been expanded in this war, it has been shrunk to far fewer nations than a quarter of a century ago . . . and it is Russia that blocks the almost universal desire for peace."

It is Russia, Hoover said, that is deliberately stalling the peace conference while it communizes Eastern Europe and exploits its economic resources. Whether we agree with Mr. Hoover or not, it can scarcely be gainsaid that behind the iron curtain which Russia has drawn across Europe lie eleven nations that were formerly independent-and that represents more countries than Hitler ever conquered. Yes, we cannot deny that the beautiful blue Danube, which turned brown when Hitler's legions marched in, has now turned to red.

No doubt the vast population of Russia yearns for peace as ardently as we do. Yet between that great people and ourselves stands the Russian government. That government consists of a group of revolutionaries who are determined that no other Russian government shall come to power the same way they did. Skilled in the school of sabotage and intrigue, that government stands today as an absolute dictatorship, wielding the power of Russia in world councils, and withholding the knowledge of the world from its own people.

So ominous is the threat of this new and unpredictable world power that the average man has all but abandoned his high hopes for permanent peace. . . .

It is in such a world and such a time that September comes again, and the miracle of the great American school system once more unfolds before eyes that have grown tired of searching for light. As millions of bright eyed youngsters put their books under their arms and trudge to school each September the world never fails to take on renewed hope. There is a dawn of a better day in the faces of the children and it simply will not be denied. Let us use this occasion and this inspiration to arouse ourselves from aimless lethargy and "to rededicate ourselves to the unfinished work." These children *must* have a future. We cannot deny them. We must build a better world. We cannot fail.

To what specific ends shall these high resolves be directed? Briefly, the goals are these:

First, *let us make democracy work.* As John Fischer so well states in his "Scared Men in the Kremlin," it is not the Red army but the communistic *idea* that we must overcome. This can be done only by demonstrating conclusively to the world that it is democracy, and not the regimented society of Russia, that can best eliminate unemployment, avoid depressions, and develop a world in which war cannot survive. We must unite behind this goal and demonstrate by actual practice the limitless power and possibilities of the democratic way of life.

Secondly, *our leadership must constantly call forth our best instead of so frequently appealing to our worst.* Our political leaders must have faith in an aroused and properly led America. Not once in our history have our people betrayed or forsaken a great leader who held out a great ideal and based his plea upon moral grounds. Our leaders must return to that great premise and be done with appeals to greed, selfishness, group interest, and class hatred.

Third, *we must rededicate ourselves to the determination that we shall not be pushed around by any dictatorship, that we shall not compromise with the immortal democratic principle of the dignity and freedom of the individual citizen everywhere.*

And finally, *we must not grow faint in our efforts to outlaw war.* The alternative is death. As the Baruch Report declares, "The choice is between the quick and the dead." Harold Fey put it well when he said that after every war the nations have put their trust in weapons which have but compounded their jeopardy. Now God has grown weary of the age old cycle. Lifting the lid on the atom, God has at last said to the world, "Choose life, or choose death, but *choose!*"

We, the living, *must* rededicate ourselves to the unfinished work

The Truman Loyalty Order (1947)

Amidst Republican charges that his Administration was "soft on communism," Truman formulated a domestic accompaniment to his anticommunist foreign policy. In 1947 he issued an executive order establishing a Loyalty Review Board for the federal civil service. The board was empowered to investigate and dismiss employees suspected of disloyalty. The Attorney General was directed to draw up a list of "subversive" organizations which would provide a basis for investigation. The Loyalty Order legitimized, and further stimulated, the frenzy of anticommunist activity in all phases of American life. SOURCE: The New York Times, March 23, 1947.

Part I

INVESTIGATION OF APPLICANTS

1. There shall be a loyalty investigation of every person entering the civilian employment of any department or agency of the Executive Branch of the Federal Government.

A. Investigations of persons entering the competitive service shall be conducted by the Civil Service Commission, except in such cases as are covered by a special agreement between the commission and any given department or agency. B. Investigations of persons other than those entering the competitive service shall be conducted by the employing department or agency. Departments and agencies without investigative organizations shall utilize the investigative facilities of the Civil Service Commission.

2. The investigations of persons entering the employ of the Executive Branch may be conducted after any such person enters upon actual employment therein, but in any such case the appointment of such person shall be conditioned upon a favorable determination with respect to his loyalty....

3. An investigation shall be made of all applicants at all available pertinent sources of information and shall include reference to:

A. Federal Bureau of Investigation files. B. Civil Service Commission files. C. Military and Naval Intelligence files. D. The files of any other appropriate government investigative or intelligence agency. E. House Committee on un-American Activities files. F. Local law-enforcement files at the place of residence and employment of the applicant, including municipal, county and state law-enforcement files. G. Schools and colleges attended by applicant. H. Former employers of applicant. I. References given by applicant. J. ny other appropriate source.

4. Whenever derogatory information with respect to loyalty of an applicant is revealed, a full field investigation shall be conducted. A full field investigation shall also be conducted of those applicants, or of applicants for particular positions, as may be designated by the head of the employing department or agency, such designations to be based on the determination by any such head of the best interests of national security.

Part II

INVESTIGATION OF EMPLOYEES

1. The head of each department and agency in the Executive Branch of the Government shall be personally responsible for an effective program to assure that disloyal civilian officers or employees are not retained in employment in his department or agency.

A. He shall be responsible for prescribing and supervising the loyalty determination procedures of his department or agency, in accordance with the provisions of this order, which shall be considered as providing minimum requirements. B. The head of a department or agency which does not have an investigative organization shall utilize the investigative facilities of the Civil Service Commission.

2. The head of each department and agency shall appoint one or more loyalty boards, each composed of not less than three representatives of the department or agency concerned, for the purpose of hearing loyalty cases arising within such department or agency and making recommendations with respect to the removal of any officer or employee of such department or agency on grounds relating to loyalty, and he shall prescribe regulations for the conduct of the proceedings before such boards.

A. An officer or employee who is charged with being disloyal shall have a right to an administrative hearing before a loyalty board in the employing department or agency. He may appear before such board personally, accompanied by counsel or representative of his own choosing, and present evidence on his own behalf, through witnesses or by affidavit. B. The officer or employee shall be served with a written notice of such hearing in sufficient time, and shall be informed therein of the nature of the charges against him in sufficient detail, so that he will be enabled to prepare his defense. The charges shall be stated as specifically and completely as, in the discretion of the employing department or agency, security considerations permit, and the officer or employee shall be informed in the notice (1) of his right to reply to such charges in writing within a specified reasonable period of time, (2) of his right to an administrative hearing on such charges before a loyalty board, and (3) of his right to appear before such board personally, to be accompanied by counsel or representative of his own choosing, and to present evidence on his behalf, through witness or by affidavit.

3. A recommendation of removal by a loyalty board shall be subject to appeal by the officer or employee affected, prior to his removal, to the head of the employing department or agency or to such person or persons as may be designated by such head, under such regulations as may be prescribed by him, and the decision of the department or agency concerned shall be subject to appeal to the Civil Service Commission's Loyalty Review Board, hereinafter provided for, for an advisory recommendation. 4. The rights of hearing, notice thereof, and appeal therefrom shall be accorded to every officer or employee prior to his removal on grounds of disloyalty, irrespective of tenure, or of manner, method, or nature of appointment, but the head of the employing department or agency may suspend any officer or employee at any time pending a determination with respect to loyalty. 5. The loyalty boards of the various departments and agencies shall furnish to the Loyalty Review Board, hereinafter provided for, such reports as may be requested concerning the operation of the loyalty program in any such department or agency.

Part III

RESPONSIBILITIES OF CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

1. There shall be established in the Civil Service Commission a Loyalty Review Board of not less than three impartial persons, the members of which shall be officers or employees of the commission.

A. The board shall have authority to review cases involving persons recommended for dismissal on grounds relating to loyalty by the loyalty board of any department or agency and to make advisory recommendations thereon to the head of the employing department or agency. Such cases may be referred to the board either by

the employment department or agency, or by the officer or employee concerned. B. The board shall make rules and regulations, not inconsistent with the provisions of this order, deemed necessary to implement statutes and executive orders relating to employee loyalty. C. The Loyalty Review Board shall also:

Advise all departments and agencies on all problems relating to employee loyalty. Disseminate information pertinent to employee loyalty programs. Coordinate the employee loyalty policy and procedures of the several departments and agencies. Make reports and submit recommendations to the Civil Service Commission for transmission to the President from time to time as may be necessary to the maintenance of the employee loyalty program.

2. There shall also be established and maintained in the Civil Service Commission a central master index covering all persons on whom loyalty investigations have been made by any department or agency since Sept. 1, 1939. Such master index shall contain the name of each person investigated, adequate identifying information concerning each such person, and a reference to each department and agency which has conducted a loyalty investigation concerning the person involved....

B. The reports and other investigative material and information developed by the investigating department or agency shall be retained by such department or agency in each case...

3. The Loyalty Review Board shall currently be furnished by the Department of Justice the name of each foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons which the Attorney General, after appropriate investigation and determination, designates as totalitarian, Fascist, Communist or subversive, or as having adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny others their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means.

The Loyalty Review Board shall disseminate such information to all departments and agencies.

Part IV

SECURITY MEASURES IN INVESTIGATIONS

1. At the request of the head of any department or agency of the Executive Branch an investigative agency shall make available to such head, personally, all investigative material and information collected by the investigative agency concerning any employee or prospective employee of the requesting department or agency, or shall make such material and information available to any officer or officers designated by such head and approved by the investigative agency. 2. Notwithstanding the foregoing requirement, however, the investigative agency may refuse to disclose the names of confidential informants, provided it furnishes sufficient information about such informants on the basis of which the requesting department or agency can make an adequate evaluation of the information furnished by them, and provided it advises the requesting department or agency in writing that it is essential to the protection of the informants or to the investigation of other cases that the identity of the informants not be revealed. Investigative agencies shall not use this discretion to decline to reveal sources of information where such action is not essential. 3. Each department and agency of the Executive Branch should develop and maintain, for the collection and analysis of information relating to the loyalty of its employees and prospective employees, a staff specially trained in security techniques, and an effective security control system for protecting such information generally and for protecting confidential sources of such information particularly.

Part V

STANDARDS

1. The standard for the refusal of employment or the removal from employment in an executive department or agency on grounds relating to loyalty shall be that, on all the evidence, reasonable grounds exist for belief that the person involved is disloyal to the Government of the United States. 2. Activities and associations of an applicant or employee which may be considered in connection with the determination of disloyalty may include one or more of the following:

A. Sabotage, espionage, or attempts or preparations therefor, knowingly associating with spies or saboteurs; B. Treason or sedition or advocacy thereof; C. Advocacy of revolution of force or violence to alter the constitutional form of Government of the United States. D. Intentional, unauthorized disclosure to any person, under circumstances which may indicate disloyalty to the United States, of documents or information of a confidential or non-public character obtained by the person making the disclosure as a result of his employment by the Government of the United States; E. Performing or attempting to perform his duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the United States. F. Membership in, affiliation with or sympathetic association with any foreign or domestic organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons, designated by the Attorney General as totalitarian, Fascist, Communist, or subversive, or as having adopted a policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or as seeking to alter the form of Government of the United States by unconstitutional means....

When Historians Disagree

What Caused the Cold War?

In May 1945 when German forces surrendered, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union were friends and allies. Public opinion polls conducted in the spring of 1945 showed that a majority of the American people had high admiration for the people of the Soviet Union, perhaps more than for the Britain. Yet by that fall, new tensions developed and within a year people were talking about a Cold War with Soviet Russia. What happened? Why did so powerful an alliance come apart so quickly? How much did the transition from Franklin Roosevelt to Harry Truman—from a president who considered himself a master of diplomacy to one who knew practically nothing of international affairs before taking office—have to do with the change in tone? Perhaps most important, what sort of different world might have been possible, if any? Historians have long debated these questions. They still do. At the height of the Cold War, in the late 1940s and 1950s, most historians, saw the Cold War as inevitable and the U.S. role as a necessity. In the 1960s, especially as more Americans turned against the war in Vietnam, historians also questioned the policies that had led to the U.S. engagement there; and began a revisionist look at the whole of the Cold War. With the opening of U.S. and Soviet archives in the 1980s and 1990s, new information became available. Two recent books reflect different perspectives on this ongoing debate, even as they share some common judgments.

Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, The Truman Administration, and the Cold War*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992, p. 3, 515-516

Arnold A. Offner, *Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953*. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2000, pp. 456-458, 470.

As World War II drew to a close, U.S. officials worried about the growing strength of the Soviet Union. The Kremlin had proven itself a valiant and courageous ally... Withstanding incalculable hardship, they drove Nazi forces out of Russian territory, across Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and back into Germany. The Kremlin was not easy to deal with. Nevertheless, America's most important military leaders, like Chief of Staff George C. Marshall and General Dwight D. Eisenhower, considered the Soviets reliable on essential military issues. Like President Franklin D. Roosevelt, they aspired for a cooperative relationship with the Kremlin in the postwar world. Yet they were also attuned to disconcerting realities: to Soviet secrecy, territorial aggrandizement, and brutality...

Initially, Stalin probed only occasionally beyond the sphere of his occupation armies. His most provocative and heinous foreign policy actions came in the latter part of 1947 and 1948, but they were in response to Western initiatives. As we have seen, the formation of the Cominform, the coup in Czechoslovakia, the purges in eastern Europe, and the blockade of Berlin were reactions to the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, and, most important of all, the affirmative program in western Germany.

There is, then, reason to assign as much of the responsibility for the origins of the cold war to the United States as to the Soviet Union. But it would be a mistake to carry the logic of this argument too far, because neither nation was simply reacting to the actions of the other ... the cold war was the legacy of World War II. That conflict deranged the international system, altered the balance of power in Europe, shattered colonial empires, restructured economic and social arrangements within nations, and bequeathed a legacy of fear that preordained a period of unusual anxiety and tension. The national security policies of the Truman administration were an attempt to apply the lessons and cope with the legacies of World War II as much as they were an effort to contain the Soviet Union.

No one leader or nation caused the Cold War. The Second World war generated inevitable Soviet-American conflict as the world's two most powerful nations, with antithetical political-economic systems, confronted each other on two devastated, war-torn continents...

President Truman inherited an expedient wartime alliance that already stood on shaky ground ... To his credit, Truman strove to measure up to the awesome responsibilities of the presidency and to have the U.S. assume global responsibilities that it had never before shouldered...

This judgment, which has been amplified in recent years by Truman biographers and triumphalist historians of the Cold War, nonetheless greatly underestimates the extent to which the president, from the Potsdam Conference through the Korean War, significantly contributed to and exacerbated the growing Cold War and militarization of U.S. foreign policy. Clearly Truman's insecurity with regard to diplomacy and world politics led him to seek to give the appearance of acting decisively, and reinforced his penchant to view conflict in black-and-white terms and to divide nations into free or totalitarian societies. He shied from weighing the complexities of historic national conflicts and local or regional policies...

At the same time, Truman's presumptions about the political-economic-military-moral superiority of the U.S. led him to believe that he could order the world on America's terms, and he ascribed only dark motives to nations or leaders who resisted its will. Monopoly control of the atomic bomb heightened this sense of righteous power. Thus he set sail for Potsdam in July 1945 determined to advance only American interests and highly disposed to atomic diplomacy. He believed that the use of the bombs on Japan would allow the U.S. to "out maneuver" the Russians in China, i.e., negate their Yalta concessions, and prevent them from getting in on the "kill" of Japan, or its occupation...